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3 **3GPP2 CORRESPONDENCE**
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14 Mr. Toni Paila
15 Chair, OMA BAC BCAST WG
16 Nokia
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20 **Re: OMA BCAST Service Protection**
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22 Dear Toni,
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25 3GPP2 has reviewed the latest version of the OMA BCAST Architecture Document, OMA-
26 AD_BCAST-V1_0_1-20050330-D. We have the following concern and suggestion regarding the
27 BCAST Service Protection architecture and mechanisms described in that document.
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29 As we understand it, the 4-layer key hierarchy for Service Protection is based on OMA DRM 2.0
30 mechanisms. In OMA DRM 2.0, the security binding for Service Protection exists between the
31 Rights Issuer and the DRM Agent on the mobile device. In 3GPP2 BCMCS, however, the
32 equivalent security binding for Service Protection exists between the Service Provider (the
33 Subscription Manager) and the subscription, as represented by the (R)UIM, or (Removable)User
34 Identity Module. From the perspective of the mobile operator, which also acts as the BCMCS
35 Service Provider, the primary purpose of Service Protection is to ensure that services are only
36 delivered to legitimate subscribers of the Service Provider. In other words, only subscribers that
37 pay for the service should be able to decrypt the services on the multicast/broadcast channel. The
38 security threat posed by the OMA DRM 2.0 based solution for Service Protection is that any end
39 user, whether they are subscribed or not to the multicast/broadcast service, can obtain access to
40 the service on the device containing the appropriate DRM Agent, by inserting his/her R-UIM into
41 that device.
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45 3GPP2 urges that OMA BCAST consider this concern in the development of security solutions
46 for mobile broadcast services. We like to suggest that the shared-secret enabled Service
47 Protection mechanism of 3GPP2 BCMCS should be considered as the default Service Protection
48 solution for BCAST for devices that contain the UIM.
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50 Regards,
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54 Betsy Covell
55 Chair, 3GPP2 TSG-X
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